What happened in Charleston and why?

Charleston, SC (August 18, 2007) — The tragic fire that killed nine of Charleston’s bravest is the worst tragedy to plague the fire service since September 11, 2001. Of course, the The immediate need that followed the disaster was to mourn the loss of so many great men and comfort their families.

But now, months after the incident, after reports and criticism begin to pour in. Simply put, we are learning that the Charleston Fire Department is operating in the past.

Use of 1″ reinforcing lines

One of the first criticisms came from firefighters across the country. Video and still images showed small snaking red hoses leading into the building. Is it possible that Charleston made the initial attack using auxiliary lines? The answer is yes, because it is how they have always done it.

These 1″ diameter rubber hoses, known as booster lines, were common on fire trucks here in the US 20 years ago. In most cities they were nicknamed “garbage lines” and were They were used to extinguish small nuisance fires and have since been phased out in most departments because they proved extremely ineffective during structure fire fighting and put firefighters at risk.

Jamy Cote, a former Charleston firefighter, told the Charleston Post and Courier: “He (reinforcer) is usually the first to be removed from the truck,” he said. “Big fire, small fire, it is very ingrained to pull the reinforcement.” Such security inadequacies convinced Cote to give up on CFDs

The flow of water from a booster line is often debated, but experts agree that 50 gallons per minute is the normal maximum. Compare that to the flow rate of a ¾ inch hand line, also carried on the Charleston engines, which is 150 gallons per minute. Nationwide, these 3/4 inch handlines are most often used to extinguish a room and contained fire in a single family home. Potatoes compared to the work faced by Charleston firefighters.

“With the amount of fire seen upon arrival at the couch depot, the Charleston firefighters should have opted to advance more powerful 2.5-inch lines,” says Battalion Chief Ron Vista of Charlotte (NC) Fire & Rescue. Monsters, yes, but at 350 gallons per minute, a two-and-a-half hose has 10 times the fire-extinguishing potential of a booster line.

Charleston Response SOPS

When a fire is reported, most departments have a pre-planned response that takes into account the type and size of the building and its occupancy. For example, if the sofa warehouse fire had taken place in Philadelphia, 4 movers, 2 air trucks, a heavy rescue team, and 2 battalion chiefs would have responded. Count 31 firefighters on the scene.

But during the real life fire in Charleston, only 2 engines and one aerial ladder were sent out. Arriving at the depot at 7:11 p.m., only 11 firefighters had assembled. Their initial focus was to extinguish a fire in the rear loading dock area, with a secondary effort to evacuate civilians and prevent the fire from spreading to the showroom and warehouse.

the shooting

An account of the incident, prepared by Chief Billy Goldfeder, says: “As time passed, smoke began to appear in the showroom and shortly thereafter an exterior door opened near where the fire was (from the loading dock). )”. At that time, the fire entered the showroom and fed a large amount of fuel – several tons of furniture.

Reports indicate that there was only one hose line to defend against the fast-moving fire. At the same time, dispatchers notified businesses that they had received 9-1-1 calls from an employee who had become trapped in a closet.

The firefighters rightfully turned their attention to the rescue operation, and the shooting was relegated to the more immediate task. At 7:20 p.m., the trapped victim was freed after firefighters breached an exterior wall.

After the rescue, the fire brigade should have been ordered to evacuate the building. Without further life safety concerns, the shooting should have moved from inside the building to an outside attack. However, firefighters remained working in the showroom, many of whom became disoriented by the smoke.

News video filmed from the front of the store clearly shows firefighters breaking windows in what would normally be an attempt to ventilate the interior of the building. However, in this case, the tactic was ill-advised and the firefighters unknowingly fed the flames the oxygen they needed to grow even larger. In Goldfeder’s timeline, at 7:25 p.m., the interior of the structure erupted in a massive flashover that consumed the contents of the building, as well as the firefighters inside. With the store completely engulfed in flames, rescue was impossible and at 7:30 pm the structure collapsed on the bodies of nine Charleston firefighters.

first findings

In recent days, the first findings of dozens of ongoing federal and local investigations confirm that Charleston is a department that has been (and still is) up and running in the past. Here is the short list of findings… and they say it very well.

Establish the Fire Department Safety Officer position

Apply incident command procedures in all incidents (ICS – NIMS procedures)

Quickly implement a personal liability system with passports and PAR

Reinforce proper use of personal protective clothing and SCBA.

Increase the response to fire from the initial structure to three engines and a ladder.

Use the third engine as a Rapid Intervention Team (RIT)

Fire Running – Dispatch the 2nd Battalion Chief, 4th Engine Company, and an EMS unit.

Use the second arriving battalion chief as incident security officer

Changes in communications, including the use of code 10

The use of the tactical radio channel for responses.

Changes to water supply standard operating procedures with short-term transition to large diameter supply hoses.

Use 1-1/2-inch or larger hose for interior attacks and also for vehicle fires.

Changes to standard nozzle flow and configuration for all hand lines

Incredibly, the changes suggested here are not new to the fire service. In fact, they are standard procedure for even the smallest volunteer fire departments in this country. It poses the question, “What the hell was Chief Rusty thinking?”

Some experts say the department is so far behind current trends that only a major restructuring could solve the problems to allow the department to operate more effectively and safely. Panels can only make recommendations, so the ability to change, if it is carried out, rests solidly with the community, the good citizens of Charleston, who deserve much better fire protection.

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